A natural basis for the detection of a wireless random reactive jammer (RRJ) is the perceived violation by the detector [typically located at the access point (AP)] of the carrier sensing protocol underpinning many wireless random access protocols (e.g., Wi-Fi). Specifically, when the wireless medium is perceived by a station to be busy, a carrier sensing compliant station will avoid transmission, while an RRJ station will often initiate transmission. However, hidden terminals (HTs), i.e., activity detected by the AP but not by the sensing station, complicate the use of carrier sensing as the basis for RRJ detection since they provide plausible deniability to a station suspected of being an RRJ. The RRJ has the dual objectives of avoiding detection and effectively disrupting communication, but there is an inherent performance tradeoff between these two objectives. In this paper, we capture the behavior of both the RRJ and the compliant stations via a parsimonious Markov chain model and pose the detection problem using the framework of the Markov chain hypothesis testing. Our analysis yields the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) of the detector and the optimized behavior of the RRJ. While there has been extensive work in the literature on jamming detection, our innovation lies in leveraging carrier sensing as a natural and effective basis for detection.
which emits jamming signals upon sensing any ongoing traffic over the wireless channel. Compared with the first two types, the reactive jammer (RJ) is more sophisticated in that it achieves high jamming efficiency by only disrupting ongoing transmissions, which in general also lowers the risk of detection [2] . A RJ faces an inherent tradeoff in the dual objectives of effectively degrading network throughput and in avoiding detection: as the "aggressiveness" of the jamming is increased, it increases the effectiveness of the disruption, but at the same time increases the ease with which a behavior not compliant with carrier sensing is detected. This detection is often based upon changes in network performance statistics such as the packet delivery rate (PDR), received signal strength (RSS), packet delivery delay, etc. However, the presence of hidden terminals (HT), i.e., transmissions detectable by the access point (AP) but not the sensing station, complicates the jamming detection problem, as the AP cannot always disambiguate whether a new packet is a (malicious) jamming decision or a (innocuous) HT mistake [3] . This motivates our work on RJ detection and RJ design in the presence of HTs. There are several related detection problems: i) deciding whether or not a specified (suspicious) station is a jammer, which is the focus of this paper, ii) identifying which station is the jammer given knowledge that there is a jammer in the network, and iii) deciding whether or not each station in the network is a jammer or a compliant station.
A. Related Works
The detection of general jamming attacks has been extensively studied in [2] - [11] . Xu et al. [2] analyze the influence of various jamming attacks on the PDR and RSS of the network, and propose a thresholding algorithm for jamming detection. Other works such as [8] , [9] utilize different metrics, such as the channel busy ratio, the number of retransmission attempts, etc., in addition to the metrics proposed by Xu, and employ machine learning based techniques for jamming detection. Shin et al. [4] proposes an approach based on group testing to identify the trigger stations, whose signal triggers the RJ activity, in wireless sensor networks. Lu et al. [7] investigates jamming attacks in time-critical networks and present analytical results of the network message invalidation ratio under jamming. There is also a body of work on analyzing jamming attacks' effects on the performance of wireless networks [12] - [14] . Bayraktaroglu et al. [14] presents theoretical results of the IEEE 802.11 throughput under various jamming attacks, and their analysis is mainly built upon Bianchi's Markov chain model of 802.11 DCF [15] .
Although there is a large body of work on jamming attacks, few analytical results have been developed about the relationship between the effectiveness and the detectability of jamming attacks, which is the central focus of our work in this paper and in our previous work [1] . Li considers mathematical models of an optimal jamming attack which chooses its jamming probability that balances the tradeoff between the long-term amount of corrupted packets and the detection time under the slotted Aloha protocol [5] . The jamming detection algorithm that Li employed is a sequential probability ratio test based on the amount of collision events. One drawback of Li's work is that it only considers the slotted Aloha protocol, which does not incorporate carrier sense multiple access (CSMA), an essential feature of the ubiquitous IEEE 802.11 protocol. The distinction between this work and [1] lies in that: [1] only consider the jamming detection problem for the simplified case (i.e., when the AP only has limited observability as introduced in §III-B); while this work analyze the jamming detection problem from the fundamental case that the access point has full observability of the whole network (in §II), and then generalize to the limited observability cases. This work made a more general and thorough analysis of the jamming detection problem compared with [1] .
B. Contributions and Outline
This paper focuses on both RJ attack design and the detection of RJ attacks by the AP, in the presence of HTs. We consider a "single-hop" wireless network in which multiple wireless stations communicate directly with a single AP, equipped with a jamming detection monitor. Our work is distinct from previous work such as [5] in that our detector leverages the CSMA mechanism underlying many modern wireless multiple access protocols. Wireless stations are compliant in the sense that they are assumed to comply with the CSMA mechanism, meaning that they sense the wireless channel and only transmit if and when the medium is sensed as idle, while reactive jammers are bad actors that violate the CSMA mechanism, meaning that they sense the channel and only transmit when the medium is sensed as active. This behavior, when identified, differentiates the reactive jammers from the compliant stations, and is the basis for the AP's ability to detect RJ. The difficulty of this detection, however, is that the AP cannot disambiguate whether a transmission on top of an active channel is attributable to the (innocuous) HT or to the (malicious) reactive jammer.
Our contributions include: i) leveraging the theory of Markov chain based statistical hypothesis testing to a Markov chain model of the transmission state of a shared wireless network with and without a RJ, ii) an upper bound on the variance of the test statistic and an asymptotic analysis of the missed detection and false alarm rate tradeoff, iii) the formulation of an optimization problem for a strategic RJ and a tractable (convex) approximation of that problem, and iv) two "reductions" in the assumed global state visible to the AP and an analysis of the impact of these reductions on the AP's ability to detect a RJ.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. §II formulates the basic mathematical model and sets up the hypothesis test for jamming detector with full observability, proposes an analytical upper bound on the test statistic's variance, and proposes the model for a jammer to choose its best jamming strategy. §III considers the cases when the detector only has limited observability. §IV shows numerical results, and §V concludes the paper. Table I lists general notation.
II. MARKOV MODEL FOR FULL OBSERVABILITY
One objective of this paper is to propose a tractable model that captures the essence of CSMA to detect potentially noncompliant stations, such as jammers. §II-A proposes a novel continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) model for the overall transmission behavior of a network consisting of CSMAcompliant stations, and also proposes a more advanced jammer called a random reactive jammer (RRJ). §II-B introduces the general supervised hypothesis testing problem of Markov chain models. §II-C presents an approach for selecting the best jamming strategy for an intelligent RRJ. §II-D introduces the semi-supervised testing problem for when only the behavior of compliant stations are available to the detector for training.
A. Mathematical Models
There have been extensively works on modeling the CSMA protocols in the literature: one group of works concentrates on using an idealized CTMC model for CSMA/CA WiFi networks and approximating their throughput [16] - [22] ; while [23] , [24] focus on using CTMC to model the interaction between the APs of multiple networks to analyze their performance. The proposed CTMC in our paper is distinct from previous works in that: i) our model is more realistic in that it is built on the physical interference model of the channel, while previous works employ a simple contentiongraph based flow model that assumes WiFi signal sensing is deterministic and does not take the randomness of interference into consideration; ii) the objectives of our work are distinct from previous works in that our work aims to use the CTMC model to infer channel statistics, such as the fraction of certain station's transmitting time, and also to detect jammers using the state transition statistics.
This section assumes the network monitor, assumed to be located at the AP, is "omniscient" in the sense that it is aware of the transmission behavior of all stations in the network, which consists of m stations and the AP. For simplicity, we also assume the stations are immobile and all stations have the same transmission power p t (an extension of the model to accommodate heterogeneous transmission powers is straightforward, but is not pursued here). We assume all stations are backlogged, i.e., each station always has a packet awaiting transmission, and as such the status of a single station k ∈ [m] may be represented by a bit: T k = 0 or 1 indicates station k is idle or active. The overall transmission behavior of the whole network is modeled by a CTMC with state space S, with cardinality |S| = d + 1 ≡ 2 m , and each state T representing a distinct subset of [m]. The state of the system is the subset of active stations, i.e., T = {k ∈ [m] : T k = 1}. We define several network parameters: the received power p o at a reference distance d o , the Rayleigh fading random variable of the k-th station F k ∼ Exp(1), the pathloss exponent α, the location vector of all the stations in [m], denoted x = [x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ], and the minimum received power required for a station to detect transmission is θ. The service rate is denoted by γ, the sensing rate is λ, and p I (k, T ) denotes the probability the channel is sensed as idle at station k when the set of current active stations is T :
Here, x k − x k denotes the Euclidean distance between stations k and k, N 0 denotes the background noise power, and
is the large-scale pathloss model. As such, (1) gives the probability that station k senses the medium to be idle (as the received power level is below the minimum power level threshold θ required for detection of activity) when the set of concurrent transmitters is T . Under the assumption that the network topology is static, the idle probability p I (k, T ) defined in (1) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a weighted sum of independent unit-rate exponential random variables (F k , k ∈ T ) with weights (l( x k − x k ), k ∈ T ). These probabilities are used in the CTMC transition rates, described below. We begin below with three variants on a simple m = 2 station network, then generalize in §II-A.2 to a network with an arbitrary number m of stations.
1) CTMC for m = 2 Stations: a) Two compliant stations: A compliant station will transmit (as it is assumed backlogged) if it senses the channel is idle, but will not transmit if it senses the channel is busy. Therefore, the transition rate of station k from idle to active is λp I (k, T ), where recall λ is the sensing rate, as shown in Fig. 1 . The HT phenomenon in the network can be clearly captured by the idle probability: if T contains only stations that are HTs relative to station k, then the idle probability p I (k, T ) is relatively high, and the transition rate into the HT state T ∪ {k} is thus high as well. b) One compliant station and one naive RJ: The behavioral difference between a compliant station, potentially a HT, and a naive RJ is that a HT will transmit regardless of its HT counterparts (since HT pairs cannot hear each other's signal), while a naive RJ only transmits with a certain jamming probability as soon as it senses signals from other compliant stations on the channel. Define the jamming probability as p J . The probability that a naive RJ k J can sense the current signal over the channel is p I (k J , T ), and thus the transition rate of naive RJ from idle to active is: λp J (1 − p I (k J , T )). The interactions between stations in a network with a naive RJ is shown in Fig. 2 . As shown, the transition rate from state φ (i.e., there are no active stations) to state {k J } (i.e., jammer k J starts transmitting) is zero, since the naive RJ is only "triggered" by an active channel. The state transition graphs in Fig. 2 and Fig. 1 are different, and in this case the Neyman-Pearson test of differentiating these two CTMCs is degenerate to a singular detection problem [25] , meaning that the test can achieve arbitrarily small error [26] . c) One compliant station and one RRJ: To avoid the singular detection problem, we propose the RRJ model, which equips the RJ with additional randomness. Fig. 3 shows the CTMC for a network containing a RRJ. The RRJ can better disguise its malicious behavior by mimicking HT: namely, when there is no traffic over the channel, the RRJ remains idle or randomly transmits packets with probability p R , and when there are compliant packets transmitting, the RRJ decides whether or not to jam the compliant packet with certain jamming probability p J . The proposed RRJ model increases the detection difficulty since the incorporation of random jamming behavior makes the RRJ similar to a HT. Thus we can define the anomalous probability of the RRJ k J as the probability that the RRJ sends jam packets when the set of active stations is T
The RRJ has (p R , p J ) as design parameters. The transition rate of a RRJ from idle to active is
2) CTMC for an Arbitrary Number of Stations:
We now extend the CTMC to an arbitrary number of stations m. Without loss of generality, index the station under test (SUT), i.e., the station which the AP is assessing, as the first station (i.e., k J = 1), and use indices {2, . . . , m} to denote the other stations, assumed to be CSMA-compliant (hereafter referred to as compliant stations (CS)). Fig. 4 shows the state transition diagram of the CTMC for a network without a RRJ (SUT is CS), while Fig. 5 shows the same with a RRJ (SUT is RRJ). From (3), the RRJ has two design parameters, (p J , p R ), with p J controlling its "reactive jamming" behavior, and p R controlling its "random jamming" behavior. Define
, where Q 0 , Q 1 are the transition rate matrices for CTMCs without and with the RRJ, respectively, and q b i,j is the (i, j)-th element of Q b , denoting the transition rate from state i to state j in S. Note that for notation simplicity, we use i (or j) to interchangeably denote: i) a specific state i in S; ii) the specific index of state i in S according to certain ordering of states in S, in the rest of this paper. From Fig. 4 , if i = T and j = T ∪ {k}, 
B. Supervised Hypothesis Testing of Markov Chain Models
Since the interaction between stations is modeled by Markov chains, we pose the jamming detection problem as a binary hypothesis testing problem, namely, to identify which of two Markov chains is more likely to have produced the sequence of observed states. This section introduces the general problem of binary hypothesis testing of Markov chains, while §II-B.1 presents the setup of the hypothesis testing problem, and the theoretical distribution of the test statistic. Then, §II-B.2 develops an analytical upper bound on the variance of the test statistic.
1) The Hypothesis Test Statistic: To facilitate analyzing the hypothesis testing problem, we transform the CTMC models proposed in §II-A to discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs) through uniformization. Choose an uniformization parameter u obeying u ≥ max
Following the standard procedure, we obtain a DTMC with transition matrix P b = I d+1 + Q b u , where I d+1 denotes the d + 1-dimensional identity matrix. We suppose the network monitor at the AP collects the transmission patterns of all stations in the network over a time interval of length W u , consisting of W intervals each of length 1/u. Each observation is sampled from the continuoustime stochastic process generated by a Markov chain in each time interval. To test whether or not the SUT 1 is a RRJ, we collect a sequence of observations of all stations' transmission on-off processes, and form the observation sequence of
t=1 , called a sample path of the DTMC, generated by a network containing a RRJ or containing only compliant stations. Under the assumption that the transition probability matrices P 0 of compliant DTMC and P 1 of RRJ DTMC are known, a binary hypothesis testing problem can be formed:
This formulation requires supervised training, i.e., the AP uses both normal (without RRJ) and attack (with RRJ) samples for training, i.e., to estimate the transition probabilities. We now derive the likelihood of y W under H 0 and H 1 . Define i) the state transition counts as the number of y W 's transitions from state i to j, denoted
, where y t indicates the t-th element of vector y W , and ii) the state occupancy counts,
denotes the stationary distribution of state y 1 of the DTMC under H b , and p b i,j is the transition probability from state i to state j. Thus, the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) between H 1 and H 0 is [25] :
, and the LLR test is:
Note that the threshold ξ(W ) varies with the observation window length W to balance the tradeoff between the false alarm rate and the missed detection rate. The most natural
That is, as evident from (5), the initial distribution has an influence on the detection threshold that decreases to 0 in W as 1/W , and as such has little impact on the test outcome for large W . The test statistics of the above LLR test is
with parameters l i,j ≡ ln
To derive the distribution of Z under H b requires the distributions of N i,j . As is wellknown [27] , the N i,j have an asymptotic (in W ) normal distribution. As a linear combination of N i,j , the test statistic Z is therefore also asymptotically normal. We henceforth use the superscript b ∈ {0, 1} to indicate a certain random variable under hypothesis
, and the variance of N b i,j may be written as (c.f. [28] ) [29] . As W ↑ ∞, transition counts N i,j , N i ,j are asymptotically independent for i = i , and thus we assume that Cov[N i,j , N i ,j ] = 0 for i = i . We have derived the covariance of N i,j between N i ,j when i = i , j = j as
with
Note the approximation (a) holds for large W by the asymptotic independence of N i,j 's.
2) Analytical Upper Bound on the Variance of the Test Statistic: The previous section showed that test statistic Z is asymptotically normal as W ↑ ∞, and we used this to derive the asymptotic mean and variance of Z under the null and alternative hypotheses. However, the expression of
] are unwieldy and difficult to compute as they includes a summation over the t-step transition matrices, which are t-th powers of the (one-step) transition matrix. In this section we develop a simpler, and more easily computable, upper bound on the variance of Z. As Z is a linear combination of the transition counts, it is useful to first derive an upper bound on the variances and covariances of Ni,j W . Xue proposed spectral and graphical bounds for the error covariance measure of the classic steady-state distribution estimator of DTMCs in [30] . However, they did not analyze the variances and covariances of the transition counts and the variance of the test statistic, which is the focus of our work.
Lemma 1: For an ergodic DTMC with simple eigenvalues, the variance of
Here, c j,i ≡ d r=1 |u jr v ri | is a constant that depends upon the right eigenvector matrix U ∈ R (d+1)×(d+1) of P b , u jr denotes the (j, r)-th entry of the U, v ri denotes the (r, i)-th entry of U −1 , and λ b 1 represents the largest non-unit eigenvalue of the transition matrix P b , in the sense that
r denotes all the other non-unit eigenvalues of P b . Similarly, the covariance of N i,j and N i,j (j = j ) has upper bound:
The proof is shown in §A.
Proposition 1: When P 0 , P 1 are ergodic and have simple eigenvalues, Var[Z b ] has upper bound:
The result follows immediately by applying Lemma. 1 to (9) .
We can see that lim W →∞ Var[Z b ] = 0 with convergence rate O(1/W ). The upper bound in (12) is a complicated function of the eigenvectors and the largest non-unit eigenvalue of P b .
C. Strategies for the RRJ Under Full Observability
While the previous subsection proposes a jamming detector based upon a Markov model of the carrier sensing mechanism of a network, this section studies how an intelligent RRJ should choose the best operating point. As an attacker, the RRJ naturally has two objectives: i) maximizing its jamming efficiency, and ii) minimizing the probability of being detected. With this objective in mind, §II-C.1 proposes two performance metrics of an RRJ, §II-C.2 develops a large deviations principle (LDP) approximation for the detection probability, and §II-C.3 formulates the RRJ's optimization problem based on the LDP.
1) Performance Metrics of RRJ: Two performance metrics are proposed with regard to the RRJ's two objectives: i) the fraction of collision time caused by the SUT; ii) the detector's error probability. Define a "collision state" as a state with multiple transmitters. In this case, the probability of a SUT being in a collision state is:
denotes the set of collision states of the Markov chain involving the SUT, and vector t ∈ R 2 m ×1 has components t i = 1 if i ∈ S 3 and t i = 0 otherwise. The jamming efficiency metric is defined as:
The second performance metric is defined either as the misseddetection rate (MDR) or as the equal error rate (EER), depending upon the context. Given a threshold ξ , the MDR
where ξ * is the specific detection threshold at which the MDR is equal to the FAR 1 Define the column vector p rrj = [p R , p J ] ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] as holding the two design parameters (p R , p J ). We assume the RRJ is aware of the design of the jamming detector, and as such its objective is to maximize the detection error (which may be captured by the MDR), under the constraint that its jamming efficiency, η, is above certain efficiency threshold, denoted τ η . To emphasis the fact that the transition probability matrix of the DTMC with a RRJ and its corresponding stationary distribution are parameterized by the jamming probabilities, hereafter we denote the transition matrix and its stationary distribution as P 1 (p rrj ) and π 1 (p rrj ) respectively. Thus, the RRJ has the following optimization problem:
Here
the inverse CDF of the standard Gaussian distribution), and thus iii) the detection objective may be written as 
Hence the usage ofσ b Z will significantly inflate the MDR in the objective function (14) if the upper bound in (12) is not tight enough. Furthermore, the (approximated) MDR in the objective, p II (ξ α ) (i.e., ξ α −∞ fẐ 1 (z)dz), cannot be expressed as a explicit function of the RRJ design parameters. Thus, it is infeasible to directly solve the optimization problem in (14) and obtain an explicit optimal jamming strategy (p * R , p * J ). As such, we consider an alternative objective function based upon large deviations theory.
2) Large Deviations Principle (LDP) for the Asymptotic Missed Detection Rate (MDR):
The Gärtner-Ellis theorem generalizes Cramér's theorem, which gives the decay rate of the probability that the empirical mean of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables deviates from the expectation, to the non-i.i.d. case [31] . It has been shown in [25] that the moment generating function (MGF) of Z 0 converges to Λ(t) ≡ ln λ max (t) where λ max (t) is the eigenvalue with the largest magnitude of the matrix P(t), whose (i, j)-th entry is p 1
. Similarly, the MGF of Z 1 is Λ(t + 1) = ln λ max (t + 1) [25] . The Fenchel-Legendre transform of Λ(t) is: Λ * (ξ) ≡ sup t∈R (ξt − Λ(t)) = sup t∈R (ξt − ln λ max (t)). According to the Gärtner-Ellis theorem, the decaying rate of the FAR and MDR for detection threshold ξ ∈ (μ 0 Z , μ 1 Z ) are [25] : lim Furthermore, the following lemma derives the convergence rate of the infimum MDR corresponding to a bounded FAR.
Lemma 2 (Stein's Lemma [31] ): Let 0 < α < 1 denote a FAR threshold, and let p α II ≡ inf ξ∈{ξ :pI(ξ )<α} p II (ξ) denote the corresponding minimum MDR. Then the asymptotic (in W ) minimum MDR corresponding to FAR α is given by the LDP lim
. According to Lemma. 2, the infimum MDR for a test that guarantees the p I (ξ ) ≤ α can be expressed as p α II = c II (W )e −I(P 0 ,P 1 (prrj))W . Since lim W →∞ ln c II (W ) = 0, we can ignore c II (W ) by assuming that c II (W ) = 1. The following Lemma and proposition show that the function I(P 0 , P 1 (p R , p J )) is a convex function of the RRJ design parameters p R , p J . Lemma 3: The rate function I(P 0 , P 1 (p rrj )) for the asymptotic (in W ) minimum MDR of an RRJ is a convex function of p R and p J .
The proof is in §B. Observe I(P 0 , P 1 (p rrj )) obtains its unique minimum of zero at p R = 1, p J = 0, where the RRJ behaves exactly the same as a CS-compliant station.
3) Asymptotic (in W ) Optimal Choice of RRJ Design Parameters (p R , p J ): We consider the RRJ's objective of finding the (asymptotic in W ) optimal (p * R , p * J ), i.e., to minimize the rate function (which maximizes the MDR) subject to the efficiency constraint: 
There are two potential issues with the constraint in the minimization problem above: i) to the best of our knowledge, the leading eigenvector of the transition matrix, π 1 (p rrj ) generally does not have an explicit expression when the dimension of P 1 (p rrj ) is high; and ii) the efficiency constraint produces a non-convex feasible set. To address both these issues, we approximate π 1 (p rrj ) via Taylor series expansion. This expansion both approximates the stationary distribution as a function of p rrj , and also converts the non-convex set to a convex feasible set (at least for the first-order expansion). The order-k (for k ∈ {1, 2}) Taylor series expansion of π 1 around the pointp rrj = [p R ,p J ] ∈ (0, 1] 2 is
with Jacobian J π 1 (p rrj ) ∈ R 2 , and Hessian H π 1 (p rrj ) ∈ R 2×2 (⊗ denotes the Kronecker product).
The k-th order partial derivative of π 1 (p rrj ) w.r.t. p R is
, in which G(p rrj ) denotes the group inverse matrix of Q 1 (p rrj ) and ∂Q 1 (prrj) ∂pR denotes the first order partial derivative w.r.t. p R [32] . The same result applies for the k-th order derivative w.r.t. p J .
The mixed second-order derivative is [32] : 
Theorem 1: The optimization problem (18) is a convex optimization problem when k = 1.
Proof: According to Lemma. 3, the objective function in (18) is a convex function of p rrj . Also when k = 1, π 1 ts is the first-order Taylor series expansion to π 1 at pointp rrj . Therefore the inequality constraint is linear and also convex in p rrj .
D. Semi-Supervised Hypothesis Testing of Markov Chain Models
The hypothesis testing problem proposed in §II-B.1 will not be applicable if the RRJ is not available for training. An alternative test that requires only the knowledge of transition matrix corresponding to the network without an RRJ, termed semi-supervised testing, is of natural interest. Intuitively, it is desired that the detector report an anomaly upon noticing a deviation in the transmission pattern from P 0 . To derive such a detector, we cast the problem as a goodness-of-fit test: H 0 : P = P 0 vs. H 1 : P = P 0 . The log-likelihood of observing a sample path y W with transition counts {N i,j } is ln f (y W ) = ln π 0 y1 + i,j N i,j ln p 0 i,j . The goodness-of-fit test between H 0 and H 1 is
and the test statistic is Z = i,j Ni,j W ln p 0 i,j . The only difference between the semi-supervised test statistic (19) and the supervised test statistic (6) is that the LLR coefficients l i,j 's in the latter are replaced by the coefficients ln p 0 i,j 's in the former. Therefore, following the same approach employed in §II-B, it is straightforward to derive the mean and variance of the test statistic under H b . In particular,
In addition, the analytical upper bound on the test statistic proposed in Proposition. 1 is applicable to the semi-supervised approach's test statistic if we replace the l i,j 's in (12) by ln p 0 i,j 's. We next develop new models in §III, but in §IV we will i) evaluate the accuracy of the test statistic variance upper bound from §II-B.2, ii) evaluate the accuracy of the Taylor series approximation to the intelligent RRJ strategy optimization problem from §II-C.3, and iii) compare the detection accuracy of the supervised and semi-supervised hypothesis tests from §II-D.
III. MARKOV MODELS FOR LIMITED OBSERVABILITY
The "full-observability" assumed in §II, i.e., knowledge of which stations are transmitting at any time, requires that AP and RRJ have the strong capability to differentiate all m of the signals emitted from the stations. Such an assumption is not feasible in practice. As such, this section makes the weaker assumption that the AP and RRJ only have limited observability. They don't know which stations are currently transmitting, but instead they only know partial information, such as, i) the number of stations currently transmitting (the "intermediate" model, §III-A), or ii) whether or not any stations are currently transmitting (the "simplified" model, §III-B).
A. Intermediate Model: Knowledge of the Number of Transmitters
To compute the test statistic Z b in §II, the AP must know network parameters λ, γ and the station location vector x in order to compute the log-likelihood coefficients l i,j . It must also know the transmission status (active or idle) of each station, at every instant in time, in order to compute the transition counts N i,j 's of the full sample path. This is a strong assumption about the capability of the AP which may not hold in practice. This subsection considers an "intermediate" model in which the AP only holds two pieces of information: i) the number of stations currently transmitting over the channel, C ≡ |T | (recall T denotes the set of currently active stations); and ii) whether or not the SUT (station 1) is transmitting, X ≡ 1 {1∈T } . The state in this model is represented by these two numbers: (C, X), which we assume the AP is able to observe. The state is a stochastic process with a (largely reduced) state space of size 2m. The resulting aggregated stochastic process is denoted {Ŷ (t) : t ≥ 0}, taking value in the aggregated state spaceŜ = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1) , . . . , (m, 1)}. Although the process Y (t) is Markov, the aggregated processŶ (t) may not be Markov. A common term for (Markov chain) state aggregation is lumping, and it is common to call a Markov chain lumpable w.r.t. a certain state partition if the resulting lumped stochastic process is Markov [33] . We show below that the full model is not strongly lumpable [33] , [34] w.r.t. the proposed intermediate state partition.
Definition 1 [33] : A CTMC is called strongly lumpable w.r.t. a partition {S k , k = 1, . . . , K} of its state space S if and only if the rate matrix Q of the CTMC satisfies that for each pair of partitions S k , S k and for any pair of states i, j ∈ S k , {3}) when station 1 has different distances to stations 2 and 3. Thus, the condition in Definition. 1 is violated, primarily due to the dependence of the idle to active transition rates on the set of current active stations.
As the Markov chain under the full observability model is not strongly lumpable with respect to the state partition induced by the intermediate model, the stochastic process for the intermediate model is not Markov. As our purpose is not to precisely model the aggregated stochastic process, but rather to detect the presence or absence of an RRJ, we approximate the intermediate model's stochastic process as a Markov process, and derive an optimal detector under this assumption. We demonstrate the accuracy of this approximation in §IV.
In order to construct the intermediate model Markov chain, we must assign transition ratesq i,j for i, j ∈Ŝ. For lumpable chains, the transition rates are obtained by directly summing the transition rates from one aggregate set to another. As our chain is not lumpable, however, we employ an alternate method, called ideal aggregate [35] . Under this method, the aggregated transition rate forŶ ,Ŷ ∈Ŝ under  TABLE II   TRANSITION RATES FOR THE SIMPLIFIED MODEL   TABLE III  CONVENIENCE PARAMETERS IN THE TRANSITION RATES hypothesis H b is:
Here, Y denotes the (random) state under the full observability model. One advantage of using the ideal aggregate is its preservation of the jamming efficiency, as shown in Proposition. 2. Proposition 2: The full and the ideal aggregated CTMC have the same jamming efficiency η.
Proof: This follows immediately from the fact that the CTMC under ideal aggregation preserves the aggregated stationary distribution of the full model for any state partition [36] .
B. Simplified Model: Knowledge of Whether or Not There Are Active Transmitters
In certain practical settings it will be unreasonable to assume that the AP is able to keep track of the number of active transmitters, much less the identities of those transmitters. As such, this section considers the "simplified" model, in which only two bits of information are available to the AP: i) whether or not there are any active transmissions among the CS-compliant stations, and ii) whether or not the SUT is active. The simplified model aggregates the station status bits (T k ) m k=1 to two bits: S = max k∈{2,...,m} T k and X = T 1 . The interaction between the SUT bit X and the CS bit S is captured as a four-state stochastic processỸ (t), whereỸ = (S, X). The simplification is equivalent to partitioning the state space S of the full-observability model into four aggregate sets, {S 0 , S 1 , S 2 , S 3 }, where i) S 0 ≡ {∅} denotes no station is active; ii) S 1 ≡ {{1}} holds the state in which the SUT is the only active radio; iii) S 2 ≡ {T ∈ S : 1 ∈ T , T = ∅} holds states in which the SUT is idle and at least one of the CS-compliant stations is active; iv) S 3 ≡ {T ∈ S : 1 ∈ T } holds states in which the SUT and at least one CScompliant station are active. The proposed state space aggregation aligns with our objective to determine whether or not the SUT is CS-compliant or not. The state transition diagram for the simplified model is shown in Fig. 7 . Table II gives the transition rates of the Markov chain on the simplified model state space under ideal aggregation ( §III-A.1), where p 0 (1, T ) = p I (1, T ) and p 1 (1, T ) = p A (1, T ), and the convenience parameters are defined in Table III .
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now present numerical results; network parameters are shown in Table IV . 2 Fig. 9 shows the network topology considered in the simulation: the topology spacing parameter R controls the number of HT pairs in the network. 
A. Impacts of the RRJ Parameters on the EER
This subsection shows how the RRJ parameters (p R , p J ) affect the detection EER. Fig. 8 shows the EER computed using the theoretical Var(Z b ) in (9) (labeled "Gaussian") and the EER computed using the upper bound of Var(Z b ) in Proposition. 1. We see the EER is not necessarily a monotone function of either p R or p J . We also observe the upper bound is somewhat loose when p R is small (with p J fixed) and when p J is large (with p R fixed). This looseness provides justification for our development of the LDP in the objective function of Theorem. 1.
B. RRJ Strategies Under the Full Observability Model
As proposed in §II-C.3, the jamming efficiency constraint may be approximated via Taylor series π 1 to approximately compute the jamming efficiency η(p rrj ). Denote the approximated efficiency obtained using π 1 ts (p rrj , k) as η ts (p rrj , k). We first investigates the difference between η and η ts (p rrj , 1), η ts (p rrj , 2) respectively. As shown in Fig. 10a (plotted on the p R -p J plane with grid interval 0.0244), the difference between the first-order and second-order Taylor series truncation is not very large, and the average relative difference
is 0.0883, and the average relative error
is 0.0828. Fig. 10b shows the absolute relative difference between η ts (p rrj , 1) and η(p rrj ), and we can see that the discrepancy is small when p R and p J are large. Fig. 11 presents the optimal p R and p J obtained by solving the optimization problem (18) , and shows that the optimal solution is always obtained at p R = 1 and the choice of p J depends on the jamming efficiency threshold. However, the efficiency constraint in (18) uses π 1 ts (p rrj , 1) which overestimates η, especially when p R and p J are small by Fig. 10a . Therefore, the optimization yields solutions that have a slightly lower jamming efficiency than τ η .
C. Comparison the Supervised and the Semi-Supervised Models
This experiment compares the detection performance of the supervised detector proposed in §II-B and the semi-supervised detector proposed in §II-D. We can see from Fig. 12 that the semi-supervised anomaly detector has a much higher EER than the supervised detector. Comparison between Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 shows the performance degradation is due to the fact that the semi-supervised test statistics have a much larger variance than the supervised ones.
D. Comparison Between the Full and Limited Observability Models
This section compares the supervised hypothesis testing of the full observability and the two limited observability models. In the simulation, we generate n = 10 4 compliant sample paths y 0 W (correspond to the DTMC with P 0 ) and n RRJ sample paths y 1 W (correspond to the DTMC with P 1 ). For each sample path with length W , we can compute the transition counts N i,j of the full model, and also we can compute the aggregated transition countsN i,j of the intermediate model, andÑ i,j of the simplified model. With the transition counts, we can compute the test statistic Z of each sample path and perform the supervised hypothesis testing to determine if a sample path is generated from the compliant DTMC or the RRJ DTMC. Fig. 15 shows the Pareto efficient allocations of the full, intermediate and simplified models with the topology in Fig. 9 . The Pareto efficiency is defined from the point of view of RRJ, i.e., a RRJ will prefer large EER and large η. Fig. 15 demonstrates that the simplified model is advantageous for RRJ in that it has a higher EER and η. This is due to the fact that the amount of information available to the jamming detector is significantly reduced in the four-state simplified model than the other two models with state space size 2m and 2 m . Fig. 16 shows the distance of each operating point (p R , p J ) to the Pareto frontier of the full model, and we can see the distance is small with large p R , which demonstrates the Pareto efficient operating points have p R value close to 1.
To investigate if the large EER gain of the simplified model over the other two models are consistent for various network topologies, we randomize the station location by randomly placing the stations in a 70 × 70 area, and plot the corresponding ROC of the three models as shown in Fig. 17 and Fig. 18 . We can see from Fig. 17 the full, intermediate, and simplified models all obtain similar detection accuracy. However, Fig. 18 shows two cases that the simplified model has a much larger detection error than the other two models. The difference among the three models' detection accuracy highly depends upon the geographical distributions of stations. 
E. Simulation Results and Comparison to Previous Work
Simulations using the network simulator ns-3 3 were performed to validate the mathematical performance analysis presented above. Such a simulation is important on account of the fact that although the mathematical model captures the essential component of IEEE 802.11, namely, carrier sensing, it does not incorporate several other important components of 802.11, such as the binary exponential backoff mechanism. The rationale for omitting these features is our focus on retaining a mathematically tractable model. Simulations provide a useful means to evaluate the validity of the model and to (hopefully) justify the model's simplifications.
Our ns-3 implementation of both compliant radios and RRJs is built upon a modification of the wireless jamming model (WJM) 4 in ns-3. The WJM includes eavesdropper, constant, random, and reactive jammer models; we extended WJM to include a RRJ which functions according to the flow chart in Fig. 19 . The flow chart shows that carrier sense compliant radios are a special case of a RRJ obtainned by setting p R = 1 and p J = 0. Parameter T J is the transmission time of a packet, and parameter T w 5 is the waiting time between two carrier sense events. Our experiments employ the topology in Fig. 9a with parameters in Table V . Each simulation lasts for around 50 seconds, and 50 independent simulations are conducted for each combination of (p R , p J ). Average EER of our approach and the one proposed by Li et al. [5] .
Due to space constraints we do not offer a full comparison of the performance analysis and the simulation results. Instead, we compare the theoretical collision probabilities r b (b ∈ {0, 1}), used to compute the jamming efficiency metric defined in (13) , with those obtained from ns-3 simulations. The absolute relative error (ARE) between the theoretical collision time under H b , denoted by r b , and the simulated collision time under H b , denoted byr b , is defined as
The average ARE of r 0 is approximately 0.16, while the average ARE of r 1 (for various (p R , p J )) is shown to be less than 0.29 in Table VI . Given the notable complexities of IEEE 802.11 omitted by our parsimonious model, we feel the fairly small AREs for the collision probabilities support our claim that the proposed model provides a reasonable, albeit simplified, approximation of the frequency of collisions incurred when IEEE 802.11 radios interact with a RRJ.
Finally, we compare the detection accuracy of our LLR test ( §II) with that of the jamming detector proposed by Li et al. [5] . As discussed in §I-A, [5] is one of the previous efforts most similar to ours. With each simulation, we use the first half of the AP's observed sample path with (or without) a RRJ for training the detector and the second half of the sample path for testing. During training, P 0 and P 1 are learned as the empirical transition matrices of the sample paths with and without a RRJ. Fig. 20 shows the average EER over 50 simulations with observation window size W = 1000 vs. p J for various values of p R . It is clear that the EER of our jamming detector is lower than [5] for all choices of (p R , p J ). This improvement is to be expected as the jamming detector from [5] is designed for the Aloha protocol (not carrier sense) and as such only can estimate jamming via collision and noncollision statistics.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper analyzed the RJ detection problem in the presence of HTs in networks by measuring (non)compliance with CS. Formulating this jamming detection problem as a generic Markov chain hypothesis testing problem, we derived an upper bound on the variance of the test statistic, and developed a novel optimization problem for an intelligent RRJ to determine its optimal operating point at which the desired tradeoff between the jamming efficiency and the risk of exposure is achieved. We introduced three models: the full observability model, the intermediate model, and the simplified model, corresponding to increasingly realistic assumptions regarding the network state information available at the AP. This paper only considers radios with fixed locations; future work may address detection of a RRJ in a network with mobile radios. APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA. 1
